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ABSTRACT: 
Place-based policies that increase jobs in local labor markets can have large benefits, but 
current policies need reforms. Local job growth can have large benefits by increasing local 
employment-to-population ratios (employment rates). These employment rate benefits are larger 
if jobs are created in local labor markets that are distressed, or if new jobs are matched to the 
local nonemployed. Current place-based policies are mostly business tax incentives, provided by 
state and local governments. These incentives are costly per job actually created by the incentive. 
More cost-effective job creation are public services to businesses, such as customized job 
training or business advice or infrastructure. Reforms to place-based policies should increase 
benefits by targeting distressed areas and the non-employed; and lower costs by placing less 
emphasis on incentives, and more emphasis on public services to business. The federal 
government can encourage reforms by capping incentives, and by providing flexible grants for 
job creation in distressed areas.  
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PART I:  SMART PLACE-BASED POLICIES CAN IMPROVE LOCAL 
LABOR MARKETS 
 
Place-based policies that create local jobs can potentially have net local benefits—they 
can increase the present value of per-capita earnings for local residents by more than they cost. 
And if place-based policies have the right goals and design, the net benefits are likely to be 
higher.  
The benefits of a place-based policy should be measured by its effects on people, not the 
place. The goal of a place-based policy should be to improve the economic lives of the people 
living in the targeted place, not just to develop the place. A place’s job growth is not the ultimate 
goal. Job growth is a means to an end goal: helping people in that place get more or better jobs.  
To increase net benefits for people, place-based policies should strive to be cost-effective 
by reducing their cost per job created. But higher net benefits also depend on targeting more of 
the jobs created on the local nonemployed, who gain more of the jobs created if a place is more 
distressed, with a greater nonemployment rate. Policies can also strive to target more of the jobs 
created on local residents—for example, through labor supply programs that develop the local 
workforce.  
Most of this essay takes a local perspective: What policies will maximize net benefits for 
local residents? At the end, I briefly comment on a national perspective, and how the federal 
government might improve place-based policies. 
WHAT IS MEANT BY “PLACE-BASED POLICIES”? 
I focus on place-based policies that help people by improving local labor markets. Why 
this focus? Because improvements in local labor markets can have major benefits for many 
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residents’ long-term labor market outcomes. If a place-based policy does not improve local labor 
markets, resident benefits are less clear.  
Local labor markets are geographic areas that contain most commuting flows: 
metropolitan areas or commuting zones, both of which are groups of counties tied together by 
commuting patterns. Such commuting leads to similar changes in labor market outcomes for 
similar workers. 
I am not focusing on other place-based policies that target census tracts or small 
neighborhoods. Sometimes such neighborhood policies improve amenities such as safety from 
crime or school quality. Sometimes such policies seek to increase jobs or capital investment in a 
neighborhood. 
These “community development” policies, which target a neighborhood, often have 
lesser benefits for residents than “economic development” policies, which target overall jobs in a 
local labor market. Neighborhoods are not labor markets. Most people do not work in the 
neighborhood they live in. More neighborhood jobs, redistributed from elsewhere in the local 
labor market, will not necessarily affect the original residents’ labor market outcomes. In 
contrast, policies that affect the number or types of jobs in an entire local labor market can have 
strong effects on the original residents’ local labor market outcomes.  
Community development policies also raise greater concerns about gentrification. 
Mobility is more extensive across neighborhoods within a metropolitan area or commuting zone 
compared to mobility across metropolitan areas or commuting zones. For a community 
development policy, even if the neighborhood improves, inter-neighborhood mobility 
complicates the question of who benefits. Perhaps we are replacing the original neighborhood 
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residents with more advantaged new residents. Place improvements should not be confused with 
benefits for people.  
NET BENEFITS FROM LOCAL JOB CREATION: STRATEGIES THAT WORK 
Place-based policies to boost jobs in local labor markets can have net local benefits if the 
increase in the original residents’ per capita earnings exceeds costs. How can this best be 
achieved? 
Research has extensively focused on the effects of local job creation that are caused by 
local labor demand shocks—for example, shocks to national demand for a place’s specialized 
industries. Based on that research, local job creation has long-run effects on local labor force 
participation, thereby boosting local earnings per capita.  
These long-run labor force participation effects are between 10 and 40 percent of the job 
creation. For every 100 local jobs created, 10–40 go to local residents who otherwise would not 
be in the labor force, and the remainder to in-migrants to the local area (Bartik 2019a). In the 
short run, local employment rates are also increased by lower local unemployment, but these 
local unemployment effects dissipate in the long term.  
These long-run effects probably result from short-term job experience. When people get 
jobs, this sometimes reshapes their life’s trajectory, reducing problems such as substance abuse, 
and increasing their skills.  
These long-run effects are at least two-thirds higher in distressed local labor markets 
compared to nondistressed areas (Austin, Glaeser, and Summers 2018). In distressed areas, more 
new jobs go to the nonemployed. 
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In addition, more jobs will go to the nonemployed if this is encouraged by public policy. 
For example, some areas impose “first source hiring agreements” on businesses receiving tax 
incentives. The incented business must consider, for entry-level positions, persons referred 
through the local workforce system. As another example, if firms creating jobs hire through local 
training programs, these programs may include local unemployed in the training pool. 
These long-run effects lead to earnings benefits. Here’s one way to roughly estimate 
these benefits: if new jobs average $60,000 per year in salaries, annual long-run earnings benefits 
from participation rate effects will equal 10–40 percent of the wages paid, or $6,000–$24,000 per 
job-year created, depending on what proportion of the new jobs go to the local nonemployed. 
When one adds in other benefits from job creation—increases in real wages and property values, 
short-run reductions in unemployment, increases in tax revenues that exceed public service 
needs—local benefits might double, to an equivalent of between $12,000 and $48,000 (Bartik 
2018a, 2019b).  
Can place-based policies have net benefits? In other words, using this rough calculation, 
can places create jobs at a cost of less than $12,000–$48,000 per job-year? Yes, but currently we 
don’t sufficiently emphasize the job creation policies that are the most cost-effective.  
Figure 1 shows costs per job-year created for various place-based policies. These place-
based polices include business incentives that provide individual businesses or industries with 
tax breaks or cash grants to create jobs. These place-based policies also include various types of 
public services to business to promote job creation. Public infrastructure programs improve such 
inputs to business productivity as transportation networks or utilities. Customized job training 
programs have community colleges provide individual businesses with free job training 
customized to the individual business’s needs. Manufacturing extension programs provide 
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smaller manufacturers with free or subsidized advice on improving the firm’s competitiveness. 
Brownfield redevelopment programs clean up contaminated sites and make the land available for 
redevelopment. 
 
Figure 1  Annual Cost Per Job-Year Created 
 
SOURCE: The derivation of these numbers is explained in Bartik (2018a). The numbers are adjusted here to 2018 dollars, and to 
an effective multiplier of 1.71 (Bartik and Sotherland 2019). The infrastructure numbers here correct for an error in Bartik 
(2018a). We assume each policy is financed by half tax increases and half spending cuts.  
 
 
This figure is based on calculations in Bartik (2018a), which in turn is based on many 
prior research studies. For business incentives, costs per job are based on a large prior research 
literature on the effects of state and local business taxes and incentives, summarized in Bartik 
(2018c).  
For infrastructure, our evidence includes a comparison of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
region with regions that were unsuccessfully proposed for similar assistance (Kline and Moretti 












versus unsuccessful business applicants in a program that distributed funds on a first-come, first-
served basis (Holzer et al. 1993). For manufacturing extension, our evidence includes a study 
that compared firms whose probability of assistance varied with distance to the nearest extension 
office (Jarmin 1999). Costs for brownfield redevelopment are based on case studies (Paull 2008).  
As Figure 1 shows, costs per job created are much higher for business incentives 
compared to targeted public services to business. These public services help overcome various 
private-market failures. Infrastructure is a public good. Private markets on their own do not 
necessarily provide a sufficient quality or quantity of job training or business advice, particularly 
for smaller businesses. Cleaning up brownfields deals with the market failure of pollution.  
Net local benefits are probably far higher for public services to business than for 
incentives. Does this mean that places should abandon incentives and rely solely on targeted 
public services to business? No. Targeted public services to business have some natural limits to 
their size. Infrastructure is sometimes a bridge to nowhere. Not all small businesses need job 
training, and not all manufacturers need advice. Only some sites are brownfields.  
In contrast, cash incentives to business are easier to scale up, as they are valued by all 
businesses. But consider that business incentive costs per job created are over $20,000, while 
local benefits are between $12,000 and $48,000, depending on what proportion of the jobs 
created go to the local nonemployed. As these rough calculations suggest, the local benefits and 
costs of incentives are likely to be closely balanced. Business incentives are more likely to have 
net benefits if the local labor market is distressed, or a first source hiring agreement or other 
policy helps target more jobs on the nonemployed.  
Although incentives sometimes have net local benefits, current place-based policies 
underemphasize public services to business, and overemphasize business tax incentives and cash 
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grants to businesses. Of the $60 billion in government resources in the United States devoted to 
place-based policies, $50 billion is provided by state and local governments, and over 90 percent 
($46 billion) of those state and local resources go to business tax incentives and cash grants 
(Bartik 2019b). Reallocating some incentive dollars to public services to business could lower 
average costs per job created, which would increase net local benefits.  
Why do state and local governments favor incentives over services to business? Cash is 
easy to hand out. Delivering quality services to businesses can be more challenging. The political 
rewards are greater for handing out cash to a few large firms; larger firms are much more likely 
to get cash incentives (Slattery and Zidar 2020). Highly visible cash incentives to large firms 
makes voters more likely to support a governor or mayor (Jensen and Malesky 2018). Services to 
smaller firms have less politically visible benefits.  
IMPROVING RESIDENTS’ SKILLS 
Directly creating local jobs is only one way to boost local earnings per capita; an 
alternative is to boost residents’ skills. Better resident skills will attract higher-wage firms and 
improve local living standards. 
Figure 2 shows the local benefit-cost ratio of skill development programs, compared with 
two different incentive policies. The local benefit-cost calculation focuses on the ratio of the 
present value of earnings increases for local residents who stay in the local labor market, 
compared to program costs.  
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Figure 2  Local Benefit-Cost Ratio 
 
SOURCE: The derivation of these numbers is explained in Bartik (2018a, 2019b). The numbers here are adjusted to local labor 
markets by assuming only 40 percent of participants in skills programs stay locally. 
 
These skills programs include 
• community college workforce programs that target jobs in demand in the local labor 
market; 
• high-quality universal preschool at age four;  
• public-school spending increases in districts with many disadvantaged students;  
• high-quality child care for children in low-income families, from birth to age four; 
and  
• place-based college scholarships for local high school graduates. 
These benefit-cost calculations for skills programs reflect three types of estimates: 1) how 
these programs affect skills; 2) how many persons with higher skills will stay in their same local 




























The calculations for the skills programs are explained in Bartik (2018a, 2019b). Evidence 
on community college workforce education is based on propensity score matching to persons 
with similar prior earnings histories (Hollenbeck and Huang 2017). The preschool calculations 
are based on a review of preschool research (Bartik 2011). For public school spending on the 
disadvantaged, quasi-experimental evidence is available owing to court orders mandating 
spending (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016). The child care benefit-cost ratio is based on 
evidence from a randomized control trial, the Abecedarian program (Bartik 2011). For place-
based scholarship programs, evidence is available for the Kalamazoo Promise, by comparing 
eligible versus ineligible students after the Promise began with similar students before the 
Promise (Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 2019).  
The incentive calculations are for the same incentive package, but in two different areas: 
an average local labor market and a highly distressed local labor market (Bartik 2019b). These 
incentive calculations are a more elaborate version of the rough estimates presented previously. 
The rough estimates simply looked at the cost per job created and the long-run effects of job 
creation on labor force participation rates. These more elaborate calculations simulate how local 
labor markets, housing markets, and local tax revenues and spending needs will evolve over each 
year of an 80-year simulation period, in response to an incentive program. The bottom line ends 
up being similar: for an average local labor market, local benefits and incentive costs are similar, 
whereas net benefits are much higher in distressed local labor markets.  
If Figure 2 had plugged in the cost per job numbers of public services to business, local 
benefit-cost ratios would often be off the chart. With costs per job created that are often less than 
one-fifth of incentives, public services to business might have local benefit-cost ratios exceeding 
10-to-1 (Bartik 2019b).  
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Based on Figure 2 and this discussion, local skills programs might have higher local 
benefit-cost ratios than average incentive programs. But targeting distressed areas, or otherwise 
targeting more jobs on the nonemployed, makes incentives’ benefit-cost ratio more competitive. 
Public services to business also can have attractive local benefit-cost ratios. 
The time pattern of benefits might matter. The values in Figure 2 are based on an annual 
discount rate of 3 percent, but some residents might place greater weight on the short term. Skills 
development programs have more of their benefits in the future, as earnings increase over a 
career. Job creation programs have more benefits up front, in lower unemployment, fiscal 
benefits, and property value boosts.  
Target groups also differ. Skills programs help younger workers more. Job creation 
programs help both younger and older workers. Helping diverse age-groups is easier with a mix 
of skills programs and job creation programs.  
WHAT SHOULD PLACES DO? 
Different local labor markets need different solutions; one size does not fit all. Some 
areas have low employment rates and need jobs. If an area already has high employment rates, 
job growth is less likely to automatically go to residents who still lack good jobs. But first-source 
hiring agreements and job training can target new jobs toward residents.  
Some areas have many residents who lack skills. These areas need job training attuned to 
the needs of local employers.  
Some areas have K–12 schools with low college attendance. These areas need to 
transform educational expectations through place-based scholarships and high-quality preschool.  
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Some areas may have unmet infrastructure needs or a shortage of high-quality business 
sites. These areas may benefit from investments in high-quality sites, by cleaning up 
brownfields, by providing utilities, and by developing good transportation links. 
Mobilizing to meet local needs requires leadership. The right local leadership will 
encompass everyone’s interests in the local labor market. This requires cooperation between 
different local governments, and between educational institutions, training organizations, and 
businesses.  
Research shows the importance of local leadership. In Why the Garden Club Couldn’t 
Save Youngstown, Sean Safford compared the response of Youngstown, Ohio, and Lehigh 
Valley, Pennsylvania, to the collapse of their steel industry base in the early 1980s (Safford 
2009). The Lehigh Valley was more successful than Youngstown in rebounding. Why? Largely 
because of local leadership that mobilized support for diversifying the local economy through 
investments in business parks, brownfield redevelopment, job training, and knowledge-based 
industries.  
A BROADER GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 
But does the nation benefit? Or is this a zero-sum game because some places take jobs 
away from other places? If we imagine that all areas follow sensible place-based policies, then 
this competition for jobs does yield benefits for the nation.  
If all places optimally subsidize job creation, through incentives or public services to 
business, up to the point at which added local benefits from one more job just equal the added 
subsidy costs, then any redistribution of jobs away from other places has no net efficiency costs. 
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The place that loses jobs will have reduced benefits from that job loss, but will also save on the 
costs of job creation programs. 
In this imaginary optimal job creation system, more distressed places will have more 
aggressive job creation programs to reflect higher local benefits. The place competition will 
redistribute jobs to where the nonemployed are, which will lower national nonemployment. 
But this optimum is not the real world. The geographic variation in incentives has little 
relationship to local economic distress (Bartik 2019b). For example, Indiana offers incentives as 
a percent of payroll that are twice as great as Illinois, even though these states’ labor market 
conditions are similar.  
Also, as already mentioned, places overinvest in cash incentives and underinvest in 
public services to business.  
The federal government could help by encouraging more targeting of distressed places, 
and encouraging less use of cash incentives and more use of public services to business. 
One possible approach is a federal “stick.” As is done in the European Union, the federal 
government could cap the magnitude of cash incentive offers as a percent of payroll or 
investment, and make that cap more stringent for less distressed local labor markets (LeRoy and 
Thomas 2019). 
Another approach is a federal “carrot.” The federal government could offer a block grant 
to state and local governments in distressed local labor markets, which would be used for public 
services to businesses to encourage job creation.  
But even without federal intervention, it is in local residents’ best interests to have more 
sensible place-based policies. Sensible policies will promote job creation more in distressed 
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David Neumark and I agree that place-based policies should be judged by whether they 
help improve job opportunities for people. We agree that current place-based policies are poorly 
designed but can be improved. However, our essays are discussing apples and oranges: we are 
discussing two very different types of place-based policies. Despite the differences, our policy 
recommendations are complementary, as I will discuss. 
APPLES VS. ORANGES 
My essay discusses place-based policies, such as business incentives, that aim to create 
jobs in a local labor market, such as a metropolitan area. David Neumark’s essay discusses 
place-based policies, such as enterprise zones, that aim to create jobs or other economic activity 
in a neighborhood. I discuss local economic development policies; Neumark discusses local 
community development policies.  
Local economic development policies are far larger than local community development 
policies. Recent estimates of the annual costs of incentives range from $30 billion (Slattery and 
Zidar 2020) to $46 billion (Bartik 2019a). In contrast, the current federal version of enterprise 
zones, Opportunity Zones, costs $1.5 billion annually (Bartik 2019a). At the state and local level, 
enterprise zones are less than 10 percent of development assistance to business (Wen 2019).  
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WHY ENTERPRISE ZONES DON’T HELP NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS 
David Neumark provides an excellent review of the evidence that enterprise zones don’t 
help the zone’s original residents. Part of the problem, as he discusses, is that some EZ-style 
policies, such as Opportunity Zones, subsidize capital investment, not job creation. Another 
problem is that in many distressed neighborhoods, encouraging job creation with subsidies alone 
is ineffective, given the neighborhood’s problems.1 But here is the biggest issue: even if jobs are 
created in a distressed neighborhood, the neighborhood’s original residents are unlikely to 
benefit. 
Why is this so? Subsidies in distressed neighborhoods tend to redistribute jobs from 
elsewhere in the metro area, because it is far easier to get a firm to choose a different location 
within a metro area than to choose a different metro area (Bartik 1991).  
Therefore, when we create jobs in a distressed neighborhood, we are mostly moving jobs 
around within the metro area. This doesn’t help neighborhood residents much, because there is 
sufficient commuting within a metro area that overall labor demand in the metro area matters 
more than where the jobs are located within the metro area (Bartik, forthcoming). If the job 
creation is accompanied by improved neighborhood amenities, as Neumark discusses, then this 
might encourage gentrification. 
NEUMARK’S PROPOSAL 
As an alternative, David Neumark proposes a jobs program targeted at residents of 
particular neighborhoods. In high-poverty neighborhoods, low-income residents would be 
 
1 Empowerment Zones might have been better at creating jobs (Busso, Gregory, and Kline 2013) because 
they included a $100 million grant for public services in each Zone, which addressed neighborhood problems 
(Bartik 2010; Neumark and Simpson 2015). 
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eligible for public-service jobs for 18 months, followed by subsidized private-sector jobs for 18 
months.  
I agree with Neumark that subsidies that increase job experience might lead to increased 
skills and earnings in the long run; I wrote a book on this theme (Bartik 2001). Evidence shows 
that subsidized job experience can improve long-run labor market outcomes. A meta-analysis of 
over 200 studies of active labor market programs found that subsidized private jobs had among 
the largest and best-supported evidence of long-term effects on employment rates and other labor 
market outcomes (Card, Kluve, and Weber 2018). 
Neumark’s subsidized jobs proposal complements my place-based policy proposal for 
local labor markets. In my essay, I suggest that job creation programs in local labor markets 
make more sense when we target more jobs on the local nonemployed. Focusing on distressed 
local labor markets is one way of doing so. Other ways, however, could include subsidized job 
experience, which might direct more jobs to the local nonemployed.  
WHEN SHOULD POLICY BE PLACE-BASED? 
Neumark’s proposal raises many issues,2 but I focus here on whether a subsidized jobs 
program should be place-based at the neighborhood level. Why condition eligibility not only on 
being low-income, but also on living in a high-poverty neighborhood? This makes sense if the 
benefits of subsidized jobs vary by neighborhood, but whether this is so is unclear.  
 
2 For example, Neumark’s proposal has a longer subsidy term than other subsidized jobs programs. In 
addition, other subsidized jobs programs put more emphasis on immediate placements in private jobs (Bartik 2001). 
Another issue is political feasibility: it seems more feasible to reform state/local economic development policies 
than to enact a federal subsidized jobs program.  
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Evidence suggests that children’s future labor market prospects vary with neighborhood 
characteristics, including the employment rate (Chetty et al. 2020). Jobs for unemployed 
neighborhood residents could have spillover benefits for others in the neighborhood.  
But do these spillover benefits vary by neighborhood? Does an additional employed 
resident have greater spillover benefits in a neighborhood with a 50 percent poverty rate than in 
one with a 20 percent poverty rate? A plausible hypothesis, but I am unaware of rigorous 
evidence that supports it.  
In contrast, for economic development programs, organizing policies at the local labor 
market level makes sense because optimal design is likely to vary greatly across diverse local 
labor markets. Research cited in my initial essay shows that the benefits of job creation vary with 
the local labor market’s distress. In areas with higher nonemployment, a greater share of the jobs 
created will go to the local nonemployed, so these areas should be more aggressive in their job 
creation policies. 
Targeting job creation policies by place makes the most sense when the net benefits of 
job creation policies vary by place. This is clearly true at the local labor market level, but it is 
unclear whether it is true at the neighborhood level.  
Target distressed local labor markets? Yes. Target the nonemployed within those local 
labor markets? Yes. Extra targeting if the nonemployed live in distressed neighborhoods? 
Maybe.  
 
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
and codirector of the Institute’s place-based research initiative, Investing in Community 
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